Objectives: This article explores lessons to be learned from three different healthcare systems and the possible implications for the management of healthcare real estate, in particular in connection to the Dutch system. It discusses similarities and differences among the different systems, in search of possible consequences on cost, financing, and design innovation. Background: To keep healthcare affordable in the future, the Dutch government is currently in the process of changing legislation to move from a centrally directed system to a socalled regulated market system. The deregulation of real estate investment that accompanies the new healthcare delivery system offers healthcare organizations new opportunities, but also more responsibility and greater risk in return on investment. Consequently, healthcare organizations must find new methods of financing. Private investment is one of the options. Methods: Three healthcare systems were analyzed on the basis of a literature review and document analysis, then schematized to show similarities and dissimilarities with regard to private investment in hospitals. Observations are based on a selection of recently published articles on privatesector financing and its implications for healthcare real estate decision making in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Results: The strengths and weaknesses of three healthcare systems with differing proportions of private and public investment in hospitals were explored. Research revealed a gap between intended effects and actual effects with regard to quality and cost. Costly private finance does not necessarily lead to "value for money." Transferring real estate decisions to private investors decreases the influence of the healthcare organization on future costs and quality. Conclusions: The three healthcare systems show substantial differences between public and private responsibilities. Less governmental involvement affords both opportunities and risks for hospitals. Private investment may lead to innovation, improved efficiency, and cost reduction, provided that the costs and benefits of decisions are not separated between different stakeholders. A missing link between infrastructure provision and healthcare delivery may impede design innovation and optimal adaptation to work processes and could lead to an inefficient allocation of risks and benefits.
Introduction
Dutch hospitals have always been private, notfor-profit organizations subject to strict government rules on quality and the investment costs of healthcare real estate. The guarantees on real estate investments by the government made it possible to borrow the necessary capital from the private sector at favorable rates. But the position of real estate in Dutch healthcare organizations is currently changing because of the deregulation of real estate investment decisions and the introduction of a regulated market system. Since the introduction of the new system, Dutch healthcare organizations have been looking for different ways to increase private investment in real estate.
Other countries in Europe have different healthcare delivery systems with a different ratio between public and private responsibility. Probably much can be learned from public and private investment in hospitals in other European countries. This article reflects on the changes taking place in the Netherlands; it brings together a selection of recently published articles on private sector financing and management models operating in the United Kingdom (UK); and it looks at the system in Germanyspecifically at recent reports on a successful forprofit provider in the German system. There is a lot of money in circulation in this area. In 2007 the total yearly real estate-related costs of the 87 general hospitals in the Netherlands were €1.5 billion (approximately $2 billion) (Prismant, 2008 ). The UK is spending more than £25 billion (approximately $41 billion) on new hospitals and other facilities. Estimates suggest that Germany may need to spend €30-50 billion ($40-70 billion) to modernize its hospitals (Barlow & Wheelock, 2009) 
. So the issue is quite important.
This article aims to analyze experiences and lessons learned from the three settings and to explore the implications for the management of healthcare real estate, in particular in connection to the Dutch system. It discusses similarities and dissimilarities of the different systems, in search of the possible consequences of cost, financing, and design innovation. First, the financing and planning of Dutch hospital real estate and changing legislation in the Netherlands is described, followed by a discussion about private investment in healthcare in the Netherlands and examples from practice. Second, the financing and planning of UK hospital real estate is discussed, followed by an evaluation based on recent research findings. The National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom uses the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), with private investors playing a dominant role in the process of design, build, finance, maintain and operate of hospital buildings. Third, the financing and planning of German hospital real estate are discussed, with special attention to the position of the Rhön Klinikum group and its overall real estate strategy. The Rhön Klinikum Group is an example of a private, for-profit hospital, quoted on the stock exchange, which fits within the German public healthcare system. This organization is expanding its operation by buying and rebuilding under-performing hospitals. WWW.HERDJOURNAL.COM ISSN: 1937-5867 HERD VolumE 3, NumbER 3, pp 70-86 CopyRIgHt ©2010 VENDomE gRoup, llC 
Financing and Planning Dutch Hospital Real Estate
The Healthcare System in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, healthcare is provided by private, not-for-profit hospitals. The costs of individual healthcare are met by obligatory private insurance funds. On March 8, 2005 , the Dutch Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports announced far-reaching changes in the real estate budgetary system and introduced a regulated market system in the healthcare sector (Hoogervorst, 2005) . The centrally steered real estate budget system with governmental before-the-event testing of building plans and investment proposals is being changed into a performance-based and output-driven finance system. Private, not-for-profit initiatives will continue to be the driving force behind hospital healthcare capacity, but in contrast to the old situation, hospitals become completely responsible for the return on real estate investments.
The main objective of the new system is to keep healthcare affordable by stimulating competition and reducing healthcare costs. Until the introduction of deregulation, the funding of capital investment for hospitals relied almost entirely (usually 80-90%) on loans from the private sector (Thompson & McKee, 2004) . Since January 2008, providers in the medical sector are required to finance real estate investments and capital costs from the income of healthcare products and services. The increased risk of return on investment caused by the deregulation of real estate investments goes hand in hand with more freedom in briefing (i.e., writing the program of requirements), designing, and managing hospital buildings. So hospital organizations must think more carefully then ever before about the consequences of real estate decisions on utility value, investment costs, and running costs. Figure 1 shows the old and new healthcare delivery systems in the Netherlands and the position of real estate within them. Real estate investment decisions usually are initiated by the hospital board. In the old system, such decisions had to be approved by the government with regard to quality (match with governmental functional standards) and investment costs (match with a cost-per-squaremeter norm). After governmental approval, the government gave a 100% guarantee to investors in healthcare real estate and insurance companies paid for healthcare providers' real estate capital costs. Deregulation of building activities for hospitals means the disappearance of both the 100% guarantee by the government on real estate investments and the guaranteed income from insurance companies for paying real estate-related costs. The changing context forces hospitals to rethink their real estate strategies and how to finance real estate.
Since the announcement of the introduction of a regulated market in 2006, private investment in healthcare and healthcare real estate is more and more coming up in the Netherlands (see box on pp. [74] [75] The subject of healthcare finance and the role of private investors are hot political issues (Verhagen & Room, 2008) . Investors want a return on investment and expect a profit. Because the real estate of hospitals can consist of hidden reserves, which could leak away to private investors, it is important to base decisions on the current value of real estate at the moment private investor participation occurs. In such a case, real estate value creation can be used to benefit healthcare delivery (Verhagen & Room, 2008) .
In a comparison of the American and Dutch healthcare delivery systems, Tromp and Baalman (2008) conclude that healthcare insurance companies in the Netherlands have a strong influence on the quality of healthcare delivery. In the Netherlands, insurance companies have a central role in the healthcare system and feel an obligation to meet the demands of patients. In America, healthcare insurance companies act as an external case manager for patients. Dutch healthcare insurance companies are likely to move to this position in the future (Tromp & Baalman, 2008 
Recent Examples of Private Investment in Dutch Hospitals
A delay in the opening of a new hospital near Rotterdam, caused by a construction failure, resulted in a debt of €30 million ($43 million) for the hospital. To overcome this debt, the hospital was taken over by a not-for-profit consortium that included a regional healthcare insurance company (40% ownership), medical staff, and regional general practitioners. This is the first example in the Netherlands of a health insurance company that has become involved in the healthcare delivery services of a hospital. This take-over is in keeping with a trend of hospitals seeking external financing and insurance companies that want to become involved in healthcare facility operation (Hoepel, Visser, & Vries, 2008) .
A joint venture between a medical group and an industrial partner was initiated to create a "21st-Century Hospital" in the south of the Netherlands. The industrial partner brought to this project knowledge of information and communication technology (ICT), medical equipment, facility management, and electronic technology. In this project, ICT innovation, with a paperless hospital as one of the results, was expected to improve the efficiency of the clinical services. The relatively high investment in real estate (€370 million [$528 million]) for 425 beds and 100,000 square meters)
should make it possible to save on operational costs and to deliver better healthcare (quantitatively and qualitatively) for a lower cost. These innovations are estimated to save 200 full-time equivalents in staffing (Siemens, 2009 ).
In 2008 it became obvious that a medical group consisting of two hospitals was heading for bankruptcy soon after their operating rooms were closed on the advice of the Inspectorate of Health Facilities. An independent advisor concluded that these hospitals had serious managerial and organizational problems. The financial and managerial participation of an investor was necessary to avoid bankruptcy and to improve the financial and functional performance of the organization. The adviser recommended cooperation with another hospital as a preferred partner and the closing of the smallest hospital (Lodewick, 2008) . In November 2008, a private investor who was willing to invest €5 million ($7 million) in the hospital was found. Retaining the hospitals in both locations is part of this investment. The government has supported the reorganization, and both the bank and the insurance company have agreed to postpone the repayment of debts for 2 years (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2009 ).
In the third quarter of 2006, a hospital in Amsterdam was taken over by a private investor to save it from bankruptcy. The new CEO and co-investor expected to make a profit within a year and a half, but this was achieved in the first quarter of 2007 (Erbudak, Brandjes, & Beijnen, 2008) . As part of the takeover, the hospital was transformed into a company in June 2007. Under Dutch legislation, a hospital is not allowed to pay any profits to shareholders, so profits are added to the budget of the hospital. This success is attributable to a central management model in which the CEO controls all expenditures, resulting in a savings of €3.9 million ($5.6 million) in 2007 compared to 2006 on a balance of approximately €100 million ($140 million). The evaluation of rental contracts with third parties within the hospital led to the termination of some contracts. The available space will be used for the expansion of the hospital's own activities. In 2007 the outsourced cleaning company was taken over by the hospital (Erbudak et al., 2008) .
Under the former system, risk analyses of banks were based on governmental approval and guarantee of the real estate investment; low risk made the financing of healthcare real estate relatively straightforward (Jong, 2008) . But the new, regulated market system with no guarantees will lead to more difficult decisions in real estate investment. In the new system, private investment in hospital real estate by banks is no longer evident. It remains to be seen whether hospitals will be capable of paying for the interest and depreciation of real estate investments in the future. Key issues are the connection between economic life cycle, cash flows, the financing arrangement and the balance sheet and interest rates of the organization. The relationship of healthcare organizations with banks as private investors will change from borrower and lender to business partners (Jong, 2008) . Alternative financing arrangements are developing, such as sale and lease-back or establishing a consortium to design and build a hospital by or with private partners. Sale and leaseback financing enforces the financial balance of an organization. A disadvantage is that healthcare organizations have to make long-term commitments with private real estate investors, decreasing their autonomy in real estate interventions.
Financing and Planning UK Hospital Real Estate
The Healthcare System in the United
Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, healthcare is provided by the NHS. Healthcare is financed mainly through direct taxation and is free at the point of delivery ( Figure 2 ). Different bodies (the primary care and hospital trusts, and the strategic health authority) are responsible for commissioning and provid- ing services and for regulation and performance management (Eskrine, Dowdeswell, & Watson, 2006) .
Since 1992 a part of capital investment comes from the PFI, which allows private consortia to finance, build, and operate a hospital for a minimum of 25 years. During this period the building is leased back to the NHS. For the government, the rationale for the introduction of the PFI into hospital procurement was threefold. First, it was seen as a way of exploiting the financial strength of the private sector and renewing healthcare buildings faster than would be the case under conventional public funding models. Second, PFI was regarded as a good way to maintain facilities during the contract lifetime. Third, the government saw the PFI as a way to take advantage of the private sector's experience and skills in order to bring innovative solutions to the needs of the health service (Barlow & Koberle-Gaiser, 2008) . The NHS commissions the work and provides clinical care; the private sector designs and builds the new facilities, then leases the premises to the NHS. In hospital development, a PFI arrangement typically involves finance, design, construction, facilities management, and sometimes "soft facilities management" (noncore services such as cleaning and catering), for which fees must be paid for the duration of the contract. The hospital trust maintains sole responsibility for all clinical services (Barlow & Koberle-Gaiser, 2008) .
The cost of the planned investments is a key factor in determining which level of approval must be sought. Projects of more than £30 million ($49 million) must be assessed by a central capital prioritization advisory group in the early stages of their development and be formally approved at a later date. Below this cost threshold, strategic health authorities have the freedom to approve projects (Thompson & McKee, 2004 projects; the trusts get an operational capital allowance to maintain assets; and some funds are available at the national level for specific objectives (e.g., information technology infrastructure) (Eskrine et al., 2006) . Figure 2 shows the connections between the healthcare delivery system in the United Kingdom and decisions on the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of hospital buildings. The government is responsible for the delivery of clinical services, which are executed by the NHS. The PFI consortium is responsible for the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of buildings. This consortium decides on the layout of a hospital and future alterations, based on the design-build-finance-maintenanceoperate (DBFMO) contract with the clinical services of the NHS trust.
Private Investment in the UK Healthcare
System
As a consequence of the PFI, significant amounts of extra capital investment have entered the healthcare arena. On the other hand, the PFI received much criticism for failing to provide clinical or architectural innovation and for the high costs to the NHS of occupying the new premises (Eskrine et al., 2006) . Two recent studies of early examples of PFI hospitals show that the PFI projects did not fulfill the original rationale of the government in terms of quality and cost. Qualitative research on the project delivery system and the relations between funding parties, contractors, and the public sector client (Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser, 2008) suggests that there is a missing link between infrastructure provision and care delivery in the PFI process. This has impeded innovative solutions for accommodating future, changing healthcare needs through adaptable hospital infrastructure in two significant ways. First, the research confirmed that the inefficient allocation of risks hindered innovation. The PFI consortium bears the risk of the real estate investment, and the NHS trust bears the risk for the production of clinical services. Alterations in real estate for greater efficiency in healthcare delivery benefit the NHS trust, but the PFI consortium bears the cost of the investment. Second, the increased complexity of the interfaces between the various components of the hospital project-operational system has impeded innovation (Barlow & Koberle-Gaiser, 2008) . In a newer "smart PFI" scheme, the design stage and tendering process are separated; however, this does not address the fundamental problem of embedding an interest in long-term performance in a public-private partnership for healthcare infrastructure design and the construction innovation needed to support this. Until a model is developed that incorporates a coordinating and integrating function and includes clinical operations, the divide between project supply/facilities management and clinical operations will remain (Barlow & Koberle-Gaiser, 2009 ).
The second recent research study examined the cost of using private sources to build, finance, and operate the first 12 PFI hospitals in the United Kingdom (Shaoul, Stafford, & Stapleton, 2008 Although the government recognizes that private financing is more costly, it believes that this £5 million ($8 million) annual cost for each hospital is "Value For Money." It is far from clear how the savings anticipated from transferring risk are to be measured in practice (Shaoul et al., 2008) . Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser (2008) demonstrated that the value of money was not to be found in design innovation. After 2008, the new funding regime with funds that follow patients on the basis of average prices will create financial pressure for trusts that are locked into PFI contracts. PFI creates budget inflexibilities that increase the pressure on the NHS to cut its greatest costs: staff salaries and facilitating effective and efficient working conditions. This, in turn, raises the risk of decreased access to high-quality healthcare services. In other words, PFI heralds an emerging conflict between real estate capital costs and the cost of human resources in healthcare (Shaoul et al., 2008) .
Hospital PFI arrangements should consider the risks associated with fluctuations in the demand for healthcare. The hospital facility could become outdated and the hospital organization could be locked into a long-term contract with one private investor. Therefore, flexibility in hospital PFI is considered essential (Blanken, 2009) . The "payment by result" system-where hospitals are paid a fixed tariff for treatment provided-is said to be creating affordability problems and making hospital income more unpredictable. Because hospitals under PFI hold all the risk for future demand changes, hospital trusts may become more circumspect in committing to large, long-term, strategic investments in the future under a PFI model (Barlow & Koberle-Gaiser, 2009 ).
Lessons Learned
One of the lessons that can be learned from the NHS PFI scheme for hospitals is that capital costs are ultimately higher compared to when the NHS borrowed the money and built and operated hospitals itself. Hospital buildings under the UK PFI scheme appear to be less innovative and less flexible. To adapt real estate for more efficient healthcare delivery is extremely difficult because of the conflict of interest between the hospital organization (which benefits from higher efficiency in delivering clinical services) and the PFI consortium (which has to finance alterations in real estate and bears the risk of these new investments). 
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Financing and Planning German Hospital Real Estate
The Healthcare System in Germany
The German health system operates as a form of public-private partnership. The state supplies the legal framework, public institutions contribute to financing, and private partners provide the healthcare (Figure 3 ). The cost of individual healthcare is paid by the statutory insurance fund. Under Germany's federal system, states have the responsibility for supplying hospital services and for developing guidelines for the structure of regional healthcare. The funding of capital investment for hospitals comes from the states, in line with the regional Krankenhaus plan (hospital plan). Any request for capital investment has to undergo a thorough and fairly lengthy approval process, which includes submission of evidence on patient need, development of a detailed functional and architectural plan, and consideration of the impact of the project on the urban fabric of the region. If approved, capital financing is released in staged payments (Eskrine et al., 2006) . Any hospital, whether publicly owned or private for-profit or not-for-profit, can apply for public funds from the state in which it is situated. Hos- pitals are allowed to borrow funds directly from the private sector, but this way of funding is subject to approval by the state government. Decisions are made on the basis of healthcare need and whether the cost of private funding is less expensive than using public funds (Thompson & McKee, 2004) . Figure 3 shows the German healthcare system and the position of real estate within the system. The German system is similar to the former Dutch system (Figure 2 above) in the sense that a private, not-for-profit hospital organization is responsible for healthcare delivery, but real estate investments are paid for by separate revenue, based on approval of the investment in advance. The German system differs from the Dutch system with regard to the financing of real estate: real estate investments are not financed by insurance premiums, but by taxes paid to the central government.
Private Investment in Germany
Private, for-profit hospitals also can operate under the German healthcare delivery system. Rhön Klinikum is an example of this. The Rhön Klinikum Group is a private, for-profit hospital group that operates under German healthcare legislation; it is listed on the stock market. Its position within the German healthcare system is illustrated in Figure 3 . Healthcare costs are paid by statutory insurance companies, but Rhön Klinikum does not make use of the separate revenue primarily for real estate investments, which makes it independent of the government with regard to decision making on real estate investment.
In its annual report of 2007, the Rhön Klinikum Group identifies itself as a leading private hospital service provider committed to the highest standards of patient-oriented care by combining the very best quality of service with good value for everyone at all times (Pföhler, 2008) . Achieving this aim requires a long-term rather than a short-term approach to all its activities. Initial investment on acquisitions as a prerequisite for establishing the quality of acquired facilities is generally written off over at least 10 years and must be supported by sustained and reliable operator concepts oriented to the needs of patients.
The long-term investment strategy is based on the acquisition of inefficient hospitals that fit into the overall location criteria of the Rhön Klinikum Group; there should be a Rhön Klinikum hospital within a 1-hour drive from all points in the country. In 2007, the national public hospital construction program was cut back, but in the same year Rhön Klinikum invested €260 million ($370 million, including €180 million [$256 million] of its own funds) on construction projects to redesign hospitals taken over in 2004.
Decisions about real estate investments are made at the highest level within the organization. The Investment Committee is the largest committee in the organization and is chaired by the chairman of the Supervisory Board, who is also the biggest shareholder. The Investment Committee is responsible for discussing and agreeing on the overall strategy of the Board of Management concerning the development of the company into which the specific investment project and financing measures must fit. At each meeting, the Board of Management routinely submits an acquisition report, which, along with an overview of the national health market, also serves as the basis of discussion on planned and ongoing acquisitions. Past acquisitions are reviewed and restructuring is assessed as part of recalculation (Pföhler, 2008) .
The combination of favorable physical conditions and adequate organizational measures appears particularly effective. At the Rhön-Klinikum, the remuneration of all staff on the payroll includes a substantial performance-related component. Great emphasis is placed on efficient patient logistics, which are subdivided into four levels of care: intensive, intermediate, normal, and low. This ensures that medical staffing levels are properly geared to the demand for care, but the consequence is that patients are moved to another level of care if health conditions change. According to the Chairman of the Board of Directors, this hospital has achieved above-average productivity by combining intelligent layout (reduced walking distances by clustering the departments around a central patient hallway; making all facilities available in the departments themselves); efficient patient logistics; an appropriate business culture; and 25% fewer staff members required for support functions.
The level of capital investment of the Rhön-Klinikum Group is nearly three times higher than in traditional German hospitals. Despite this high level of capital investment, Rhön-Klinikum is able to be profitable by combining three important principles: (1) integrated capital and revenue profiling; (2) work process systematization; and (3) a compact and adaptable building concept (Bjorberg & Verweij, 2009 ).
Lessons Learned
An important lesson to be learned from this strategy is the benefit of a good fit between the building and the healthcare delivery processes. To reduce nursing costs, much attention is paid to functional relationships with short distances between related functions. As a result, Rhön-Klinikum has abolished nursing departments defined by medical discipline (Bjorberg & Verweij, 2009 ).
Another important lesson to be learned from the Rhön-Klinikum Group is the advantage of an integral responsibility for both real estate investment and the delivery of clinical services. Real estate is used as a resource for production. The real estate strategy is part of the organizational growth strategy. Investments, proposals, and alterations in real estate are decisions made at the highest level of an organization. Investments have to be profitable within a period of 10 years. Innovation and alterations that benefit more efficient delivery of clinical services are implemented throughout the company. Consequently, the Rhön Klinikum Group can increase its profit by delivering healthcare at a lower cost in comparison to public hospitals in Germany. Comparison of the Three Healthcare Systems Table 1 summarizes some of the main characteristics of the supply, cost, and financing of healthcare delivery and real estate in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The table displays the different responsibilities of public (shaded) and private (white) organizations in these systems.
Several things are immediately apparent:
• The three healthcare systems show large differences between public and private responsibilities.
• Only the new Dutch system is making the private sector responsible for the capacity planning of healthcare; the sole role of the government is as market superintendent. Leaving the capacity planning to the private sector risks a mismatch between supply and demand and hospital bankruptcy caused by poor planning and competition with other hospitals.
• Only in the United Kingdom are healthcare cost regulation and capacity planning steered by one-public-organization (the NHS), whereas healthcare supply (the public NHS trust) and real estate supply (a private PFI consortium) are delivered by two different organizations. Separating the responsibilities of healthcare supply and real estate supply bears the risk of contradictory interests, e.g., between trying to reduce real estate investment costs and operating costs versus optimizing the building to facilitate its primary function and reduce the cost of human resources.
• Approval of the program of requirements, design, or investment and operating costs by a public organization may lead to time-con- suming procedures regarding real estate decisions and could hinder innovation. Critical comments on this issue were quite common in the old Dutch system and in the German system for private, not-for-profit hospitals. On the other hand, leaving before-the-fact quality control to the market could lead to problems with usability, health, and safety.
• The risk of being forced to borrow money from private banks to invest in healthcare real estate can be that the banks do not want to finance healthcare real estate because of its particular function and limited future value to other functions. Another reason is that banks have stringent requirements regarding interest and require a guarantee of repayment. In the old Dutch system, the government guaranteed timely repayment.
This risk of a disinterested bank became even more obvious after the credit crisis of the summer of 2008. In the Dutch situation, where payment to shareholders is forbidden, this crisis led to fewer investments in healthcare real estate. But at the same time, the Rhön Klinikum group raised €430 million for new investments by an issue of shares. It seems clear that, in the new Dutch system, searching for business partners who want to invest for profit will be more common, and parties that are willing to finance healthcare real estate will become more important in real estate decision making.
Another way to compare the three healthcare systems is to look at the perspectives of different stakeholders and the effects on real estate decision making (Table 2 ). In the literature of Corporate Real Estate Management (CREM), four primary stakeholders are distinguished (Jonge et al., 2008) : (1) policy makers, with a business perspective and a focus on long-term strategies, who strive for a balance between quality and costs, profit, and optimal overall performance of the organization; (2) users (staff, patients, visitors), with a process perspective and a focus on usability, i.e., effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction; (3) controllers, with a financial perspective and a focus on integrated cost, finance, and the ability to make a profit; and (4) real estate managers, with a forward-looking perspective and a focus on flexibility and real estate risk.
In Table 2 the business perspective is associated with how innovations in real estate can be used to improve overall corporate performance; the process perspective deals with the alteration of real estate to improve its main function, i.e., facilitating the healthcare delivery process; the financial perspective of real estate decision making pertains to controlling the cost of real estate investments and the ability to make a profit; and the future perspective of the real estate manager relates to managing the risk of the real estate portfolio and the role of flexibility.
Based on Table 2 and the descriptions of the healthcare systems in relation to private investments in real estate, certain conclusions about the effects of the healthcare system on real estate decision making regarding the scale of healthcare organizations again become apparent.
• Innovation is stimulated if the responsibility for it is in the hands of the same organization that benefits from the innovation. If a hospital board can decide on innovations without the approval of another party, then profitable innovations can be implemented more quickly.
• Real estate interventions that benefit the core mission and healthcare delivery process will be implemented more easily when hospitals benefit from the alteration and can decide autonomously, without the approval of another organization.
• The distribution of profits that result from improved hospital performance to shareholders may be a factor in improving the efficiency of healthcare delivery; this stimulates investment in real estate to reduce the cost of other resources, such as staff. ties and risks. Hospitals may benefit from the involvement of private investors by making use of their expertise and finance capacities, which may lead to innovation and improved solvency. At the same time, separate responsibilities with regard to the production of clinical services and real estate value creation may hinder design innovation and adaptation to business processes as well. Transferring real estate decisions to private investors decreases the influence of the healthcare organization on future costs and quality. PFI projects in the United Kingdom showed that PFI charges were higher than expected in a number of cases; total costs over a 30-year lifetime also were higher compared to a situation in which the NHS borrowed the money, built, and operated the hospital itself. The final impact on cost and quality in the long term is somewhat ambiguous.
Concluding Remarks and Further Research
Since the introduction of the regulated market system in the Netherlands, several private investors have entered the Dutch healthcare system. This article points to a number of implications of the changing system in the Netherlands and two other healthcare systems. These include the impact on the cost and financing of healthcare real estate (controller); flexibility and risk (facility manager/real estate manager); strategic decisions on cost, quality, and innovation (policy maker); and supporting healthcare delivery (users, i.e., staff and patients). The possible effects of different responsibilities with respect to healthcare supply, healthcare real estate, and alternative financing options on healthcare facilities (design, build, management, lifespan, and effectiveness) were also discussed. This discussion informs the present debate in the Netherlands and many other countries that also are considering changes to capital financing in healthcare real estate, such as the Scandinavian countries, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.
Limitations of the Present Research
These research findings are discussed on a general level and not yet in relation to patient outcomes or clinical services. Decisions made by different stakeholders in different phases of the design-construction-operate-maintenance cycle have not yet been fully analyzed. Actual financial comparators were not available, and at this point real estate investment and performance indicators cannot be compared to achieve a proportionate understanding of the investments and savings of the three healthcare systems. An alternative model for researching this topic would be a meta-analysis of the national developments in different countries.
Follow-Up
Further research is needed to enable the development of a conceptual framework for different types of private/public partnership for invest- The findings presented in this article will be used as input for additional in-depth case studies of private investment in hospitals at the meso-and micro-levels (e.g., network organizations, specific hospital organizations, units) and their impact on quality and costs, profitability, and competitive advantage.
